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Domestic Relations-FAULT IN MARRIAGE DISSOLUTION-Peterson v.
Peterson, - Minn. -, 242 N.W.2d 103 (1976).

The element of fault remains in Minnesota's marriage dissolution
proceeding despite the enactment of no-fault divorce legislation.' Following the decision in Peterson v. Peterson,Ievidence of marital misconduct continues to be admissible in the3 determination of alimony and
division of real and personal property.
In Peterson, the husband appealed from the trial court's order which
fixed alimony and property division without consideration of evidence
of the wife's misconduct. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court's ruling that the misconduct was too remote in time to be
accorded the status of a "prevailing factor" 4 in the determination of the
award. However, in addressing the issue of marital misconduct, or fault,
as it affects property distribution, the court concluded that the no-fault
legislation has not removed evidence of fault from the proceeding as a
matter of law "upon a showing of proper circumstances." 5
Admission of evidence of marital misconduct into any stage of a marital dissolution seems inconsistent with the judicially recognized purpose
of the legislation to minimize the bitterness of divorce.' Retention of
fault conflicts with the awareness that a marriage break-down may
cause spousal misconduct as well as result from it.' Elimination of fault
as a ground for divorce' gives credence to that distinction but failure to
eliminate fault completely merely postpones the bitterness to a later
stage of the proceeding.
Some states have completely eliminated fault from the divorce proceeding.5 Other states have expressly retained fault in the determination
1. Act of Mar. 14, 1974, ch. 107, 1974 Minn. Laws 157 (codified at MINN. STAT. §§
518.001-.01, .03, .06-.16, .17-175, .25-.27, .54-.59, .62-64, .66 (1976)).
2.
- Minn. -, 242 N.W.2d 103 (1976).
3. See generally MINN. STAT. § 518.55 (1976) (court to determine "whether or not either
spouse is entitled to alimony"); id. § 518.58 (court to consider "all the facts and circumstances of the case" to arrive at a just disposition of property).
4. See Minn. - ...
242 N.W.2d 103, 108 (1976). The Peterson decision, by
sustaining the trial court's finding of remoteness, suggests the viability of condonation as
a possible defense. The misconduct preceded an earlier suit for divorce which was dismissed when the parties reconciled. Another defense, laches, prevailed in a suit for alimony which was initiated 18 years after the divorce. See Corah v. Corah, 246 Minn. 350,
75 N.W.2d 465 (1956).
5. See -

Minn ....

242 N.W.2d 103, 108 (1976).

6. See id.
7. See id. (factors evidencing fault are often merely symptoms, rather than causes, of
marital breakdown).
8. See MINN. STAT. § 518.06(1) (1976) (ground for dissolution is irretrievable breakdown
of marriage relationship). An irretrievable breakdown may be proved by evidence of detrimental conduct or serious marital discord. Thus, the statutory language retains the flavor
of fault. See id. § 518.06(2).
9. The Iowa court found that the legislature had intended to abolish the fault factor
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of the alimony award and property division when enacting no-fault statutes.10 Minnesota may have joined the latter group through judicial
construction of its no-fault divorce act and interpretation of the Minnesota Legislature's intent. Although the legislature neither expressly
eliminated nor retained fault in the statutes, it has failed to pass subsequent bills which would have done so." It also amended the statutes
which empower the courts to award alimony and property division to
conform to the no-fault terminology but otherwise did not alter them. 2
The Peterson court construed these actions as indicative of the legisla3
ture's intention to retain fault in the determination of the award.'
Reinforced by the Peterson court's interpretation of the no-fault act,
the role of marital misconduct with respect to alimony and property
division may not change. The Minnesota court in the past has adhered
to the principle that the parties' conduct is always material in determining the amount of support." Generally, fault is most significant where
the dependent spouse, usually the wife, who seeks alimony and a large
portion of her husband's property,' 5 is also the spouse accused of misconduct.'" However, only rarely will the wife's misconduct be considered
grave enough to overcome and outweigh her need for support. 7 Because
and further observed that both parties to a marriage are at fault in a marriage breakdown.
See In re Marriage of Williams, 199 N.W.2d 339, 345 (Iowa 1972). California expressly
eliminates fault. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 4509 (West Supp. 1977). The grounds for divorce
have been restricted by the Michigan Legislature to breakdown of the marriage relationship. See MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 552.6 (West 1976). However, a Michigan court has
found that conduct of the parties remains relevant to the determination of alimony and
property division. See Kretzschmar v. Kretzschmar, 48 Mich. App. 279, 210 N.W.2d 352
(1973). Accord, Flanagan v. Flanagan, 270 Md. 335, 311 A.2d 407 (1974); Chapman v.
Chapman, 498 S.W.2d 134 (Ky. 1973).
10. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08 (West Supp. 1977) (retains evidence of adultery
and any other factor necessary to do equity in the determination of alimony, despite
enactment of no-fault grounds).
11. The Peterson court notes that the legislature has failed twice to enact bills aimed
at eliminating fault from the divorce proceeding. See

103, 107 n.4 (1976).
12. Compare MINN.
13.

-

Minn.

-,

STAT.
-,

-

Minn ....

242 N.W.2d

§§ 518.55, .58 (1976) with id. (1971).
242 N.W.2d 103, 107-08 (1976).

14. See Buerfening v. Buerfening, 23 Minn. 563, 564 (1877).
15. MINN. STAT. § 518.59 (1976) empowers the court to award to either spouse up to onehalf the value of the other spouse's non-coverture real and personal property.
16. See, e.g., Swanson v. Swanson, 233 Minn. 354, 360, 46 N.W.2d 878, 882 (1951)
(marital harmony cannot be promoted if "a wife may drive her husband from her without
prejudice to her claim for alimony and property"). This principle, referring to the wife, is
presumably applicable to a husband. The legislature drafted the statute using the term
"spouse" without any reference to sex. See MINN. STAT. §§ 518.55-.63 (1976). However,
the Minnesota Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to affirm this principle as to
a husband's award of alimony.
17. See Baskerville v. Baskerville, 246 Minn. 496, 512, 75 N.W.2d 762, 772-73 (1956)
(court affirmed alimony award without regard to husband's financial worth because of
wife's grave misconduct). Cf. LaFroth v. LaFroth, 297 Minn. 185, 210 N.W.2d 246 (1973)
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the husband's marital duty to support his wife is to be supplanted by
the court's award, the award is based on the wife's present and future
needs and the husband's ability to pay." The dependent spouse's need
is the controlling factor. Although an errant spouse does not stand the
equal of one whose conduct is irreproachable," the court has observed a
"somewhat chivalrous and well-established policy''" of basing the
2
award primarily on need even in the face of misconduct. '
Fault is only one of several factors used to determine the extent of the
duty to support the dependent spouse. 2 The award of alimony and
property should reflect this duty and not punish either party. 23 This
duty, however, may be lessened by the dependent spouse's misconduct 2
because it is unfair that a "husband should be held to a full performance
of his marital duties when [the wife] has neglected to perform hers." 5
Using this reasoning, the apparent inconsistency of admitting fault into
a no-fault dissolution is justifiable as a means of protecting the economic interests of a spouse who is legally bound to support a dependent
unfaithful partner.
Although misconduct on the part of the supporting spouse is also
material, an award influenced more by that misconduct than by the
needs of the dependent spouse may not be sustainable" because the
(per curiam) (wife's ten-year adulterous affair and her ability to self-support were factors
in denial of alimony and award of 10% of husband's estate).
18. See Johnston v. Johnston, 280 Minn. 81, 86, 158 N.W.2d 249, 254 (1968).
19. See Buerfening v. Buerfening, 23 Minn. 563, 564 (1877).
20. See Webber v. Webber, 157 Minn. 422, 426, 196 N.W. 646, 647 (1923).
21. See Felsheim v. Felsheim, 298 Minn. 287, 214 N.W.2d 696 (1974) (wife's unemployability and long period of marital service prior to her misconduct merited alimony). Vandewege v. Vandewege, 284 Minn. 330, 334, 170 N.W.2d 228, 230 (1969); Reiland v. Reiland,
280 Minn. 444, 448, 160 N.W.2d 30, 33 (1968) (dictum).
22. The court has listed the parties' conduct as one of many factors to be considered.
See, e.g., Hertz v. Hertz, 304 Minn. 144, 229 N.W.2d 42 (1975) (factors include age of
parties, their present and future earning abilities, their needs, conduct during marriage,
duration of marriage, and parties' stations in life); Ruprecht v. Ruprecht, 255 Minn. 80,
96 N.W.2d 14 (1959). In Messer v. Messer, 289 Minn. 449, 452, 184 N.W.2d 801, 803 (1971)
the court stated that good conduct should be one of the factors. Good conduct apparently
may be substituted by long years of service. Compare Vandewege v. Vandewege, 284
Minn. 330, 170 N.W.2d 228 (1969) with LaFroth v. LaFroth, 297 Minn. 185, 210 N.W.2d
246 (1973).
23. See Gilbertson v. Gilbertson, 300 Minn. 553, 554, 220 N.W.2d 512, 513 (1974) (per
curiam); Markegard v. Markegard, 293 Minn. 503, 197 N.W.2d 726 (1972) (per curiam);
Johnston v. Johnston, 280 Minn. 81, 86, 158 N.W.2d 249, 254 (1968); Wilcox v. Wilcox,
222 Minn. 279, 285, 24 N.W.2d 237, 240 (1946).
24. See, e.g., Vandewege v. Vandewege, 284 Minn. 330, 334, 170 N.W.2d 228, 230 (1969);
Borchert v. Borchert, 279 Minn. 16, 154 N.W.2d 902 (1967); Baskerville v. Baskerville, 246
Minn. 496, 75 N.W.2d 762 (1956).
25. See Swanson v. Swanson, 233 Minn. 354, 359, 46 N.W.2d 878, 882 (1951). Accord,
Baskerville v. Baskerville, 246 Minn. 496, 508, 75 N.W.2d 762, 770 (1956).
26. See Gilbertson v. Gilbertson, 300 Minn. 553, 554, 220 N.W.2d 512, 513 (1974) (per
curiam); Cloutier v. Cloutier, 261 Minn. 324, 329-30, 112 N.W.2d 347, 350-51 (1961).
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award should satisfy needs and not punish either party.Y If the supporting spouse challenges the court's assessment of the dependent spouse's
needs, however, that misconduct may be emphasized by the court in
sustaining the award."
The Peterson decision supports the policy of using fault as one of
many factors in determining the duty to support. In spite of the no-fault
divorce act, admission of marital misconduct remains a component of
the balancing 9 necessary to reach an equitable division of property and
a just determination of alimony.

Land Use Planning-THE

METROPOLITAN LAND USE PLANNING

ACT-Act

of Apr. 2, 1976, ch. 127, 1976 Minn. Laws 292.
In response to steady, rapid urbanization of the Twin Cities area, the
Minnesota Legislature in 1976 declared all metropolitan' governmental
units to be interdependent' and established requirements and procedures for comprehensive, coordinated land use planning. Their product,
the Metropolitan Land Use Planning Act, 3 provides a design for the
coordination and control of metropolitan growth as a joint effort between the Metropolitan Council and local governments. It also provides
a method through which local proposals and plans will be exchanged
among local governments likely to be affected. Prior to the Act, a community might carefully design, plan, and commence construction of a
high-priced residential area on the city's edge, oblivious to the concurrent designation of the adjoining property as industrial by the neighboring community. The Act addresses the extra-territorial concerns of developing communities as well as the ultimate need to control metropolitan growth. If the local governments and the Metropolitan Council are
able to resolve quickly conflicting land use planning objectives, a comprehensive development scheme for the metropolitan area will result.
The Metropolitan Land Use Planning Act is the product of nearly a
decade of land use policy development 4 by the Metropolitan Council.27. See note 23 supra.
28. See Bollenbach v. Bollenbach, 285 Minn. 418, 175 N.W.2d 148 (1970); Borchert v.
Borchert, 279 Minn. 16, 21, 154 N.W.2d 902, 906 (1967).
29. See MINN. STAT. § 518.58 (1976) ("all the facts and circumstances of the case" are
to be considered).
1. The Metropolitan Land Use Planning Act [hereinafter referred to as Act] affects
the counties of Anoka, Carver, Dakota, Hennepin, Ramsey, Scott, and Washington. See
MINN. STAT. § 473.872 (1976).
2. See MINN. STAT. § 473.851 (1976).
3. Act of Apr. 2, 1976, ch. 127, 1976 Minn. Laws 292 (codified at MINN. STAT. §§ 462.355,
473.121, .175, .851-.872 (1976)).
4. See Freilich & Ragsdale, Timing and Sequential Controls-The Essential Basis for
Effective Regional Planning: An Analysis of the New Directionsfor Land Use Control in
the Minneapolis-St.Paul MetropolitanRegion, 58 MINN. L. REv. 1009, 1018-24 (1974). For
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